Limiting Child Labor Through Behavior-Based Income Transfers: An Experimental Evaluation of the PETI Program in Rural Brazil
Child labor is commonly believed to be harmful for children. Evidence suggests that child labor leads directly to lower years of schooling (Psacharopolous, 1997) or at least to lower learning per year of schooling (Akabuyashi and Psacharopolous, 1999) . Other studies have shown that child labor leads to lower lifetime earnings and higher incidence of poverty (Ilahi et al., 2001 ). Emerson and de Souza (2000) found that child labor helps to perpetuate poverty across generations. In addition, child labor may harm the physical development and health of children. Long hours may lead to exhaustion or illness, while hazardous work or exposure to chemicals may lead to death or disabling illness or injury.
Despite widespread agreement that child labor is harmful and should be eliminated, 1 about one of every eight children aged 10-14 are engaged in full-time work worldwide. The highest labor force participation rates for children aged 10-14 are in Africa (26.2%), Asia (12.8%) and Latin America (9.8%). 2 Despite a law that restricts child labor for children under age 14, the child labor force participation rate in Brazil is 16%.
In Brazil as in other countries, child labor is much more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas. Around 30% of rural children work compared to 8% of urban children. One reason is the difficulty in enforcing laws in the presence of informal employment relationships. In urban areas, 59% of working children are not paid. In rural areas, 91% are unpaid. The majority of working children provides unpaid labor to family enterprises. Absent a formal employment relationship or a distinction between the workplace and the home, it is very difficult to distinguish illegal work from legal chores.
Without a credible enforcement mechanism for legal interventions, households would need an incentive to reduce child labor. It is commonly assumed that children work because their parents are poor, not because parents are indifferent toward their children's welfare. Baland and Robinson (2000) demonstrate theoretically that credit constrained households will choose inefficiently high levels of child labor. Consistent with the theory, numerous studies have found that as household income increases, the incidence of child labor falls. 3 This suggests that one way to reduce child labor is to transfer income to credit-constrained households.
Stronger markets for child labor also induce increased incidence of child labor and lower child enrollment rates. 4 This suggests that another way to lower the proportion of children working would be to raise the opportunity cost of child labor. One plausible mechanism is to make child time in school a more attractive option. While it is true that work and school are not necessarily mutually exclusive activities 5 , a child cannot be in school and at work at the same time. Consequently, policies which increase child time in school must limit the amount of time potentially available for work.
This paper analyzes the effects of the program known as the Programa de
Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) which was implemented in poor states of Northeast
Brazil. The PETI provided income transfers to poor households in exchange for an agreement that the child would attend school at least 80% of the time. In addition, the child had to attend an after-school program that effectively doubled the length of the school day. While it is conceivable that the child could work after completing the extended school day, the PETI expected to reduce child labor by shrinking the available child time that could be allocated to work. By implementing the program in states with high incidence of hazardous child labor, the PETI aimed to reduce particularly onerous types of child labor as well. However, funding restrictions prevented all children in a municipality from participating in the program.
Consequently, it is possible that by artificially constraining labor supply of program children, the program could raise the return on labor force participation for children who did not participate in the program.
Using data on children in PETI municipalities and children in a matched set of control municipalities, this study derives estimates of the program's impact on child schooling, labor supply, academic performance and hazardous work. We find that the program increased time in school, reduced labor force participation and hazardous work, and increased academic success for children in the program. For the most part, spillover effects on nonprogram children were small and insignificant. However, we do find evidence that as program children reduced their working hours, nonprogram children became more likely to work ten hours or more.
Consequently, there were some adverse spillover effects on nonparticipants. Nevertheless, the overall municipal impact of PETI, net of any potential adverse impact on nonparticipants, is almost universally in the direction of program objectives. Consequently, the PETI appears to be a successful mechanism to speed the decline of child labor in rural areas.
I. Background
The legal working age in Brazil is 14. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 1 , children under age 14 do work. In urban areas, 12% of boys and 6% of girls aged 10-14 are in the labor force. Incidence of child labor rises from 3% to 10% as age rises from 10 to 13. Child labor is more common in rural areas: 48% of boys and 23% of girls aged 10-14 work. Incidence rises from 21% to 43% as age rises from 10 to 13 for rural children. While child labor may be illegal, it is not easy to monitor. This is particularly true in rural areas where most children work in family enterprises. Ninety percent of rural working children are engaged in agriculture. Complicating enforcement is the lack of formal employment relationships--91% of rural working children work without pay. Absent a means of enforcing the law, government has opted to alter the incentives that lead to child labor.
In 1996, the Brazilian government initiated the Bolsa Escola program to address problems of poverty, schooling and child labor in urban areas. Analysis of that program 7 shows that income supplements tied to child enrollment had a small positive impact on enrollment rates.
The impact on child labor appears to be small, at least in part because child labor is less common in urban areas. In Brazil, any effort to reduce child labor significantly must be extended to rural areas where 96% of the working children reside.
A. The PETI Program
The Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) was first implemented in rural states in 1996. The program was similar to the urban Bolsa Escola in that it tied a transfer payment to school attendance of children aged 7-14. However the program also included a feature absent in the urban program that directly attacked the likelihood of child labor. Program features include:
• Qualified households must have per capita income below one-half the minimum wage (R$65/month which is roughly equal to $65/month in U.S. dollars).
• Households were required to sign a contract stipulating that their child would not work.
• The child would attend school at least 80% of the time.
• The child would attend after-school sessions called the Jornada Ampliada which roughly doubled the length of the school day.
The content of the Jornada Ampliada was not specified by the program. It was subject to local control, varying from academic programs to intramural athletics. The common feature of the after-school program is that it limits the remaining time for children, making it more difficult for them to work. Consequently, the Jornada Ampliada may not raise school attainment because of its programmatic content but by limiting child labor.
The federal government funded the stipend (referred to as the bolsa), and also paid for part of the after-school program. The local government had to pay the administrative costs and the remainder of the after-school program costs. Local costs averaged 25% of the program costs beyond the bolsa. 38% of the children aged 7-14 work. Bahia was targeted because of the presence of child labor in sisal (agave) production. In Pernambuco, 18% of the children work. Pernambuco utilizes child labor in sugarcane production. Sergipe uses child labor in the fishing industry.
Seventeen percent of children work in that state.
The sample statistics for the three states reported in Table 2 reveal additional information on the nature of the child labor problem in these states. Virtually all children aged 7-14 are enrolled in school, but 17% of those in Pernambuco and Sergipe are also working. In Bahia, the proportion working is 38%. Those who work average over ten hours per week, and children average just below 10 hours per week in housework. For those children who do work, age of labor market entry averages between 7 to 9 years of age. Consequently, a large proportion of children in these states spends as much time working as they spend in school.
Average educational attainment is over one year behind grade level for this sample of children whose average age is 10.5. Table 3 reports the distribution of occupations for working children in these states. By far the most common enterprise is agriculture with a few engaged in family-run stores or fishing enterprises. More detailed information on activities within agriculture point to many relatively dangerous tasks including clearing land, caring for livestock, harvesting and processing.
However, the most impressive statistic is the large average number of working hours regardless of occupation. Keeping in mind that these are children aged 7-14, it is likely that many of these children are quite tired when they are in school.
II. Experimental Design and Data
Data for the evaluation were collected by Datamerica. In each state, data were collected from 6 municipalities. The six municipalities were divided into two groups. The treatment group was composed of three municipalities which were participating in the PETI program. The control group included three similar municipalities which were not part of the program. In Bahia and Sergipe, the control municipalities had expressed an interest in participating but were scheduled for later implementation. In Pernambuco, the control municipalities were taken from three that had initially opted not to participate. All three have since expressed an interest in becoming PETI municipalities. Because of differences in the program and control features across states, evaluations are conducted separately by state.
From each municipality, 200 households with at least one child aged 7-14 were drawn randomly for the sample. Information on household, parent and child attributes were collected.
For PETI households, information on the number participating children and the first year of participation were also obtained.
Five indicators of program success were collected. Those include school enrollment, labor participation, hours of work, sector of employment, and highest grade attained. This information was collected for both program and other children in the sample. These indicators will allow us to assess whether the PETI program reduced child labor, lowered the incidence of risky child labor, raised school enrollment, or improved academic performance.
The relevant population universe for this study is all households with children in the age range 7-14. In each municipality, 200 households that satisfied that criteria were selected at random. That population was further reduced by 6-10%, depending on the municipality, to exclude households that were too wealthy to qualify for the PETI program. Consequently, the analysis will concentrate on the poorest of the poor households.
The sample definition is illustrated in Figure 1 . The universe of qualified households in the PETI municipalities was subdivided into two groups. Group A includes all households that participated in the program. Group B included qualified households that did not participate in the program. This may include households that decided not to participate or households that wanted to participate but were excluded.
In analysis reported below, we show that assignment into groups A and B is not random, so we cannot use group B as a control for group A.
Children in group A households can also be subdivided into two groups. Group A1 includes all children who are part of the PETI program. However, households were not obligated to sign up all their children. Children in group A households who are not in the program form group A2.
Even if they do not receive direct benefits from the PETI program, children in groups A2 and B may be influenced by the program. PETI will provide after-school programs that are open to all children, whether or not they are enrolled in the program. On the other hand, PETI will artificially lower the child labor supply, potentially raising child wages and inducing increased labor supply for children in groups A2 and B. Consequently, the evaluation will need to assess spillover effects on these groups, even if they are not proper controls.
The true controls are households in group C that would have qualified for the program but were prevented from participation because their municipality did not have the program. In Pernambuco, the control municipalities had initially opted out of the program but have since reconsidered. In the other two states, control municipalities were excluded because of budget constraints.
A All analyses are reported including covariate controls for heterogeneity in observable household attributes. If PETI and control municipalities were drawn randomly from a universe of homogeneous communities, we would not need to correct for possible covariation between treatment effects and household attributes. However, with only three control municipalities in each state, it is possible that there are underlying differences between control and treatment groups resulting from small sample bias. In fact, joint tests of differences in sample means between PETI and control municipalities rejected the null hypothesis of equality in all three states, although the differences are small numerically. A second issue is to assess whether assignment into the PETI group A is random in PETI municipalities. A probit model of PETI participation among eligible households is reported in Table 4 . We could reject the null hypothesis of random assignment into the PETI program, although the pattern of participation by observable household attributes was not always internally consistent. For example, those with higher incomes were more likely to participate, but so were households whose parents were less educated. A few variables indicating distance to school had marginally significant impacts, although the pattern of participation with respect to school proximity was mixed. What is important for our purposes is that the probit equation confirms that households in group B are different from households in group A. Consequently, households in B cannot be treated as a control for group A.
B. Specification
The sample definitions suggest the following specifications to assess the impact of the PETI program:
I: Impact on PETI children versus other municipal children versus control: The advantage of specification III, relative to I or II, is that it reflects the general equilibrium effects of PETI on covered and uncovered children. Because of the possibility of negative feedback effects of PETI on child labor for uncovered children, it is possible to find strong positive effects of the program in I and II and find neutral or negative effects in III. Thus, III is the most complete measure of the program impacts.
C. Data and Variable Definition
The initial survey design called for information to be collected from 3600 households across 9 PETI and 9 non PETI municipalities. Complete data were obtained on 3564 households with 6772 children between ages 7-14. Sample means on these observations are reported in Table 2 .
The experimental design limits the analysis to households that would be eligible for the program. This limited the sample used in the analysis to 2864 households with 5611 children.
There are several indicators of program success. The first is the impact of the program on hours in school. 12 In order to receive the bolsa, program children have to be in school and attend the after-school program. Consequently, a positive impact on school hours for program children is virtually assured. Of more interest is whether the program reduces school hours for children in {A2} or {B}.
The program is aimed at reducing child labor, but it is very difficult to enforce that provision when most children work on family farms or enterprises. However, the PETI restricts a child's time budget, making child labor less feasible. We consider two measures, one being the child labor force participation decision and the second being whether the child works 10 hours per week or more. It may be that the impact on the program is not so much in eliminating child labor as in reducing how many hours a child works. These measures will also allow us to assess whether the program induces labor market entry or increased work hours for children who are not covered by the program in {A2} and {B}.
The Jornada Ampliada did not have a prescribed curriculum, so its value may differ across states and municipalities. Reports indicate that the program varied from sessions that were closely integrated with the regular teacher to a complete lack of integration between the two. Nevertheless, even by adding available time for study or by reducing child exhaustion through reduced child labor, the Jornada may improve academic performance. Despite its relatively short implementation period, GFA should rise in PETI municipalities, particularly those which have had the program the longest.
The final objective of the program is to reduce forms of child labor which place the child at risk. It is important to emphasize that the data were only available for a single cross-section in 1999. Consequently, we rely heavily on the assumption that the municipalities excluded from the program can serve as an adequate control for those in the program, holding constant the covariate measures of observable differences, Z. In other settings where estimates of program effects using difference-in-differences methods were compared to estimates using crosssectional differences with covariate controls, results obtained were similar across estimation strategies. Tables 6-10 . We will discuss each of those tables in turn.
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V. Results
Estimation of specifications I-III are reported in
A. Time in School Table 6 reports the estimated impact of PETI on school hours. First, looking at the effect on participant children in PETI households, average hours in school rose 11-17 hours in Pernambuco, 17 hours in Bahia and 12-15 hours in Sergipe. The impact is larger, the longer the child has been in the program. The program has no significant impact on local children who are not in the program. Therefore, children will not voluntarily attend the Jornada Ampliada without the subsidy, but they will not reduce time in school either.
In going from specification I to III, the magnitude of the effect is smaller, but remains positive and significant. Consequently, any negative impact on the nonprogram children in the household are not large enough to drive the household average effect to zero. The impact is further reduced when we move to the municipality-wide effect in specification III.
14 Nevertheless, the results suggest that in both Bahia and Pernambuco, average time in school rose 8-10 hours (40-50%) per week across all eligible children in participating municipalities.
The change in school hours is smaller but still positive in Sergipe. There, time in school rose an average of 5 to 23%.
The conclusion from Table 6 is that the PETI successfully increased time in school for program children while imposing no collateral damage on nonprogram children.
B. Time in the Labor Market
PETI parents agree not to have their children work, but that agreement is difficult to enforce. However, the Jornada Ampliada may limit a child's available time for work. Table 7 shows that the probability time of working for PETI children fell 4-7 percentage points in Pernambuco, nearly 26 percentage points in Bahia, and nearly 13 percentage points in Sergipe.
At the same time, probability of work fell for nonprogram children, albeit by an imprecise amount. In going to the household average estimate II, the effects get smaller, but none change sign or significance. Finally, averaging across all children in the municipality, work probability drops 5-6 percentage points in Pernambuco, nearly 18 percentage points in Bahia, and around
percentage points in Sergipe.
Child labor force participation may not be a problem if the child is working relatively few hours. Table 8 repeats the exercise in Table 7 , but measures the PETI impact on the probability that a child works at least 10 hours per week. The magnitude of the reductions are smaller than the impact on labor force participation in Table 7 , presumably because children were more likely to participate if they were already working fewer than 10 hours per week. In addition, in Bahia and Sergipe, probability of working at least 10 hours increases for nonprogram children. In Sergipe, the spillover increase in labor supply behavior for nonprogram children is large enough to outweigh the small benefit to program children so that the municipality-wide probability of working at least 10 hours is unaffected by PETI. In Bahia and Pernambuco, probability of working 10 hours drops by 4.5 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively.
Overall, PETI lowers child labor force participation, but is less successful in limiting the probability of working 10 hours or more. There is evidence that in Bahia and Sergipe, some children increase their specialization in labor while others participate in the PETI. Unreported regressions suggest that average hours worked across all children decreased 1 to 2 hours per week as a result of the PETI. Relative to sample averages reported above, that is a decline of nearly 50% in all three states.
C. Success in School
Estimates of the effect of PETI on grade-for-age are reported in Table 9 . Participating children had significant gains in all three states. The gains remain significant but smaller when nonparticipant children in the household are included in the treatment group A. In Pernambuco,
there is an apparent decrease in grade-for-age among nonparticipants as a result of PETI of .08 grades per year of age. There is no evidence of collateral harm to nonparticipants in Bahia or
Sergipe. The total impact on PETI municipalities is positive in all three states. The effect is significant in Bahia and in the Pernambuco municipalities that implemented PETI in 1996.
We cannot pinpoint why the Jornada Ampliada enhanced the educational experience of PETI children. As the program is expanded and various academic plans for the Jornada are tried, analysts may be able to identify which types of after-school programs best enhance academic performance. As pointed out above, however, simply lowering the incidence of child labor may have improved academic performance.
D. Hazardous Work
The main motivation of the PETI program is to reduce the incidence of dangerous work.
Our evaluation of the PETI impact uses an ordered probit analysis to estimate the change in probability of being in risk categories1-4. The results are reported in Table 10 . Because the impact on occupational hazards is spread over four coefficients, we derive a summary measure of the change in risk:
which is the weighted sum of the changes in marginal probabilities of being in risk level i associated with PETI status. The weight is the associated risk level i. The resulting measure, δ, is the change in average risk level in the population. If δ < 0, occupational risk falls.
The significance test refers to the test of whether the associated dummy variable coefficient is significantly different from zero. All but one of the PETI coefficients is significant, but none of the coefficients on nonparticipant status is significantly different from zero.
In all states, the probability of being in the lowest risk group rises and the probability of being in risk groups 2-4 falls. The pattern holds not only for PETI participants, but for nonparticipant children as well. Consequently, there is no evidence that nonparticipant children entered risky work as participant children left risky jobs.
In Pernambuco, the average risk level in the absence of PETI was 1.39. Among treatment children, the change in risk scores, δ, fell by 0.1 to 0.2 points. The impact across all children in PETI households is somewhat smaller. However, when the municipal effect is measured, the magnitude remains at -0.2 over three years and -0.1 over one year.
Consequently, ending average risk drops to 1.2 to 1.28 in PETI municipalities.
Bahia had the largest risk in the absence of the program and experienced the largest average risk decline. Children in PETI households experienced sharp reductions in risk level of more than 0.4 points, with no apparent increase in risk for children in nonparticipant households.
The municipal effect is -0.24, so the average risk drops to 1.36.
Sergipe has the smallest reduction in risk when evaluated at the municipal level, although it had the lowest initial level of risk. Average risk fell by 0.06 over 1 year and by 0.1 over two years.
VI. Conclusions
The Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) attempted to combat child labor through two interventions. The first was to create the Jornada Ampliada, an afterschool program that had the potential to complement the regular school academic program.
The second was to provide a subsidy (called a bolsa) to poor households whose children attended the Jornada at least 80% of the time. While all children could attend the Jornada, budget constraints meant that only a subset could receive the bolsa. Consequently, there was a possibility that the program would benefit participating children but would have adverse child labor and education consequences for nonparticipating children.
An evaluation based on experimental design principles found that the program had a positive impact on children who participated in the program. They spent more time in school, less time at work, less time in risky work, and progressed in school at a faster rate. In Bahia and Sergipe, the PETI program appears to have caused a slightly higher probability for nonparticipant children to work more than 10 hours per week. In Pernambuco, nonparticipating children appear to have had slightly greater difficulty progressing to the next grade. In no case were the adverse effects large enough to outweigh the positive effects on participating children. The positive effects appear to be largest in programs that have been put in place the longest.
While the incidence of child labor has decreased as per capita incomes have increased, it has persisted in rural areas and in areas where household incomes have stagnated. While government policies aimed at improving school quality have been implemented world-wide, it is doubtful that improving schools alone will reduce child labor. Poor households may not be able to afford to remove their children from the labor force, even if schools offer better services.
Indeed in Brazil, most working children are also enrolled in school. In the PETI municipalities, nonparticipating households did not send their children to the Jornada--only children in households that received the income supplement spent significantly more time in school.
Consequently, the PETI experience suggests that to speed the reduction of child labor in poor households, income transfers tied to the reduction of child labor will be necessary. Table 2 . Coefficients represent percentage point change in probability of child labor. ** indicates significance at 5%. * indicates significance at 10%.
(--) = coefficient not estimable. Variable perfectly predicts that child is out of labor force. 
